in W"U ."tuping technology, retailers auto-aticatty monitor each *a Ay**rcaliy adjust pi-ces contingent on rival's stock availabi KEy wopos AND PHRASES: cOntingent pricing, e-commerce, inform vertical differentiation.
Rnrernrc on trr INrsRNer oFFEns UMREcEDENTED amounts of inform and rivals alike. Many retailers provide detailed product informa product description, technical specification, product manual, acc customer reviews, and product recommendations, on their web stages of e-commerce, many online merchants did not accuratel to their inventory systems, so that stockout information was n time.DuringthelgggholidaySeason'manyshoppersordered but were notified days later that the item was sold out u 11. To im vice quality, nowadays many retailers voluntarily display real-ti on ttreir web sites l22l.For example, retailers such as Amazon Drugstore.com clearly state each product's availability on their such as Amazon and HSN even indicate the number of units lef running low. while this degree of information transparency is us their pioduct purchase decision, it can also be used by competito price and product offerings. This strategic use of a rival's stocko focus of this PaPer.
The use of information transparency for competitive purposes h and observed in financial markets. The London Stock Exchange' in which it changed from open outcry to an electronic, screen-b demonstrates this strategic use of information transparency. T system at the Exchange publicizes dealer trades and positions t allowing the latter to take advantage of this information. Clem 7l observed that if a dealer had an unusually short position in a dealer had an unusually low inventory level in the shares of dealers would raise their prices and thus reduce the profitability short position. In this fashion, the dealers sustained losses of hu poonJ, as they used the transparency to compete with each ot ways. we think that the increased transparency offered by the tail,ers, combined with the ease with which prices can be chang profit-reducing phenomenon in electronic retailing ' In this paper, we examine online retailers'proactive informa with shortales. Oftentimes it is inevitable that products are out difficult to accurately predict customer demand, especially for s (list price $39.99) and Nintendo wii (list price $539.93) were in su that sellers on eBay were selling the first item for $100 or more and t for as much as $3,000 [27] . While the issue of stockout is common in both the traditional an channels, e-retailers have more incentive to maintain lower inventory of their extensive product variety offerings. Although online shopp some shipping delay, they expect the item to be shipped from stock u been notified otherwise. One frequent complaint from customers is th out of stock. According to a site survey of 50 retailers by the Chicago group Inc., 14 percent had backordered or out-of-stock merchandise [ [5] sampled 107-books, including NewYorkrimesbestsellers and ra Bool<s in Print, Sver 13 u.S.-based online bookstores and two physic in April 1999. They found that there were significant price dispersion and no single bookstore in either channel carried all the sample titles, store in the sample carried at least 90 percent of the best sellers.
Even though shortages may be inevitable, online retailers make an municate stockout information in real time with customers by conne systems to Web servers and offering some indication of inventory positio sites. This product availability information together with price and d information is accessible to both buyers and sellers through search. W there are some price comparison sites such as Dealtime.com and Ne offer product availability information across stores. This informatio not comprehensive or updated frequently enough. So, even though th some information about availability, it is far from perfect for items th supply. Hence, a customer using price comparison sites is constraine frequency schedule and item coverage chosen by the product/retailer co site. To get real-time stock and price information, customers have to s Web sites directly.
On the other hand, a retailer who wants real-time information from may be less limited. Because competing firms are constantly interac other, they have the incentive to invest in screen scraping orweb scrap so as to cost-effectively gather information about the target product fro sites. Traditionally, retailers cannot efficiently monitor rivals' stock i the physical channel. However, in the online environment, because pro information is available at retailers' sites, a firm can build a web age software program that can navigate through web sites and automatical content or extract relevant data. With a one-time investment in Web scr ogy, retailers can significantly reduce the cost oftracking competitors's mation b! automating the monitoring process. But for individual custo from a one-time purchase cannotjustify the high fixed cost involved in Web agent. Because retailers are less constrained than customers in ge stock information, they have more up-to-date product availability inf until the that available to customers and are able to exploit this transparent in strategically in the electronic market.
We know that the costs of price adjustment are high in the physical c sales personnel have to manually change the displayed prices for eac dition to changing the price in the database. In the online channel, firm update the price table once and the price change is reflected on eve page. With real-time stockout information about rivals and negligible in price adjustment, online retailers can act strategically and take ad information transparency. specifically, they can make prompt price response to rivals' invcntory status changes. The objective of this pa tigate retailers'optimal dynamic pricing strategies in the online chan not been studied before,
We consider two situations. In the first case, duopoly retailers are op are symmetric in customer expectation of availability. Because custom probability of finding the product in stock at retailers, firms compete we show that although a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exis proof equilibrium does.
In the second case, customers expect different levels ofproduct avail two retailers. We show that in a market with shortages, customers will retailer to visit based on both retailers'prices and their product availab find that when customer reservation value is relatively high, a unique p Nash equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, both retailers choose to adop technology, monitor each other's inventory status, and exploit the onli transparency by dynamically adjusting prices contingent on rival's av Literature Review Tms pepnn ts RELATED ro A FEw srnrnus of literature that study competitio stockouts, consumer search, and the competitive use of information. pa 9l) in the economics and marketing literature model firms'prices when th probability that customers may be rationed. These papers assume that are homogeneous. In equilibrium in these papers, customers do not s only one firm, and firms do not use rivals' stockout information strate Another set of papers in the operations literature (notably, Lippman [6] , Mahajan and van RyzinflTl,and parlar [20] ) have dealt with firm on product availability while ignoring customers' cost of searching for the item in stock. customers can search more than one firm in case of a stockout, de expected utilities. They show that when search costs are low, both f imperfect availability levels, even if higher availability levels are co run. Because occasional stockout can soften firms'price competitio more by stocking less. varian [29] studies a symmetric n-firm's com equilibrium. There are informed and uninformed customers in the mar mixed strategies on price and occasionally offer sales to price discr informed and uninformed customers. Although this paper allows fir on price, it does not consider the issue of stockout and its effect on c behavior.
Our paper is also related to literature that studies competitive us in financial makets. clemons and webber [6] observed that follow Stock Exchange's "big bang," the demise of the trading floor becam the first week of screen-based trading. The screen-based system incre transparency on the price and the quantity available to buy or sell. H the benefits to the Exchange in terms of increased liquidity and effici Exchange members lost money because they were able to use the compete in unprecedented ways. A later study [7] also shows that th based trading system does not reveal subtle information, such as wh trading, what they know, and how much more they have to trade, wh traders could infer in the old floor trading. In the absence of inform effective price negotiation, market makers are cross-subsidizing so trades with informed traders. Thus, the naive designs of electron intermediaries at risk of opportunistic new entrants (off-exchange that target attractive accounts.
We incorporate new features of online retailing in our model an impact of information transparency on retailers' price competition. ket with shortages and consider customers' optimal search behavio retailers can invest in Web agent technology with which they can their rival's stock availability. similarly, as in clemons and webbe that retailers do not always benefit by taking advantage of such inform ency, but the social welfare is improved because search costs are red pricing equilibrium.
The Model corusmnn rwo oNLTNE RErArLnns, indexed I and2,selling a seasonal pro arrival at each retailer is a random process. Because of demand u time to)time retailers experience stockouts. Customers choose which based on their expectation ofretailers'prices and product availability product availability is a commonly used performance measurement and external evaluations. Usually, customers cannot observe retailers even in the online environment. But they do form an expectation of a r model [2] , level or order fill rate in terms of the probability that the product is in stoc their past experience, word of mouth, or advertising.
we assume that both retailers have access to the web scraping technolo financially capable of adopting the technologyr and developing a software automatically tracks its rival's stock status. We describe the decision time lin 1. First, each firm decides whether or not to make its prices contingent on stock position. with the help of the software agent technology, retailers c a dynamic pricing policy because of the negligible online menu cost. The their prices. Firm i (i = l,2) will charge p. when its rival has the product in 4, when its rival is out of stock. Intuitively, pi< 4,. So if firm i chooses a ing strategy, it will not adjust ips price when its rival is out of stock-that Having observed retailers'prices and fill rates, customers will choose wh to visit based on their optimal search strategies, and they may visit the sec if the first one is out of stock.
Next, consider customers. customers have a common reservation valu product, and each customer has a unit demand for the product. As sta customers form a common expectation on retailers' prices and fill rates because they cannot observe retailers' inventory capacity and do not know t fulfillment at the retailers' sites, at the time of purchase, customers have to retailer's site to learn about its inventory status. In addition, customers inc cost /c when shopping online, and & is different among customers. This ass heterogeneous search cost is consistent with the results of empirical studie We assume that search cost t is uniformly distributed in the interval of t0 the population. [30] , amon those models, customers either search for the best price or for the best fit p in Balachander and Farquhar [2] , customers search to discover product ava our model. A customer's utility from a search is defined as
if products are out of stock.
In case of a stockout at the first retailer, a customer can continue searc second retailer or choose a third option, which could be consuming othe placing a backorder, or purchasing in the physical channel.3 To better focu ers' price competition game, we normalize customers' utility from a third zero.a Although it is possible that no customer may search or even buy th if r is small relative to /r, we focus our study on the more interesting case customers search for the product. We assume that the customer reservati high epough so that they prefer search over the third option.
Let s, and s, be the order fill rates of retailers I and 2, respectively. We cases: symmetric fill rate when s, = s2 = s and asymmetric fill rate when we ta without loss of generality.
cgy and are e agent that ne in Figure  ,n Consider the case in which customers expect an equal probability of fin in stock at retailers, assuming ll2 < s, = J2 = ,t < l. If both retailers price, then customers will randomly choose a retailer to visit. If one lower price, for example pr ( pz, then all customers prefer to visit the 1 first. Only when they find retailer I is out of stock will they search product. This model setting differs from the standard Bertrand com the firm charging a lower price cannot satisfy the total market dem cost pricing is not an equilibrium result, and the high-price firm wi profit. To see this, consider the case in which both the firms charge If one of them raises its price, then all of the customers will first vis HoweveE they will come back to the firm with the high price whe firm has a stockout. Hence the firm that raises its price from the ma a positive profit. So marginal cost pricing is not an equilibrium. In f the stronger result that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategy back to Frances Edgeworth.
lzmma I: When retailers have an equal fill rate, there is no N in pure strategies.
The proofs are in the Appendix.s
Morgan and Shy [9] and Shy [23, 24] introduce an equilibrium undercut-proolequilibrium. Under this equilibrium concept, each price so as to maximize profit while ensuring that its rival will not u That is, a firm picks a price that is sufficiently low so that its rival profitable to set an even lower price so as to grab all of the first firm
Here we exhibit an undercut-proof equilibrium in which a retailer s that its rival has no incentive to undercut it. Proposition l: When retailers are symmetric in fill rate (s , = uildercut-proof equilibrium exists in this retailer price competiti retailer i charges p = w + (r -l/s -w)(1 -s) and retailer j cha high-price retailer j sells only when the low-price retailer i is o pacity-constrained Bertrand competition model. In this undercut-pr retailers have equal expected profits. Because retailers are symmetric tomers will pool on the low-price retailer first when retailers charge The high-price retailer will serve customers only when the first retaile In this case, retailers will not invest in web scraping technology, a dynamically adjust prices either.
Case2: Asymmetric Fill Rate (s, < sr)
In this case, we assume that retailers are differentiated in order fill rate have established their reputation on order fill rates (s,, sr) in the mar rates satisfy l/2 < s, ( J, ( l, which are exogenously given in our m sumption says that customers all believe that they have a higher proba the product at retailer 2,the high service quality retailer. we focus our fulfilled expectation equilibrium. Thus, we assume that retailers will ha ing inventory levels such that customers'expectations on retailers, p availabilities are fulfilled in equilibrium. Also, the high fill rate retail marginal cost, that is, w, > w,, because of longer product shelf time.
Because each retailer has two price strategies to choose from-sta dynamic pricing-four scenarios are under consideration, as shown obtain the retailers'equilibrium pricing strategies in each scenario sep ing that all customers search in case of a stockout. Hereafter, we use refer to scenarios. For example, n,DD refers to the profit of retailer f i pricing game.
Each customer will decide which retailer to visit first depending on h cost and retailers'prices and fill rates. Also, when a customer first visit finds the product is in stock, he or she may purchase the product or con the other retailer. we use s-to represent a customer,s contingent s which is to visit retailer i fiist and continue searching retailerT in ca out of stock. If we suppose that a customer chooses to purchase the pr searching further when it is in stock, then his or her expected utilities strategies ^S,, and Sr, ile given by We describe the relationship between customers' search costs utilities under the two contingent search strategies in Figure 2 , customer makes a higher expected payment dnd incurs a lower e under the contingent search strategy S, than the strategy S,r.
Lemma 2(a) indicates that if 0. to < l, then customers with low visit the low fill rate retailer first because of the lower expected pay with higher search costs will visit the high fill rate retailer first b expected search costs. So /<o is the type of customer who is indiffer contingent search strategies. When fto = 0 or fto = l, customers wi or retailer l, respectively. Hereafter, we focus our study on the c equilibrium-that is, 0 < ko. 1. Lemma 2(b) implies that whe their optimal search strategy, they will purchase the product if the their first search and will not check the second retailer because o availability and the existence of search costs.
Static Price Competition
we begin with a benchmark case, the static pricing game, which mi retail price competition. In the static price competition game, r price throughout the period. Their expected profit functions are (3) and (4) ' '?", We focus our study on the case where the two retailers are activ the same time-that is, 0 < ftoss < l-so that some customers prefe first and others prefer to visit retailer 2 first. This happens when th tion Css ) wr-w, is satisfied.T At the proposed equilibrium pric separate with more than one-third of them preferring to visit the lo first. As can be seen in Figures 3a and 3b , both retailers'prices ar low fill rate s, and increasing in the high fill rate sr. This implies th ers are more differentiated in terms of fill rate or service level, the is relaxed and each retailer can charge a higher price. Also, the co increasing in s, and decreasing in s,. This indicates that we are lik tomer-separating equilibrium when retailers are more differentiate i fixed marginal cost difference.
It is interesting to see that, depending on the parameter values, th high fill rate retailer may be lower than that of the low fill rate reta and 4b). This is because, even though it has a lower probability of < css, r = 4 , w r = 1 , enJoys when both retailers adopt the web scraping technology, they can clo other's stock status and engage in a dynamic price competition to the online information transparency. Each retailer chooses one low p price and adjusts its prices contingent on its rival's inventory stat search process ofa random customer with search cost k in Figure 5 cost ft is uniformly distributed over [0, I ] and customers with k < /co v ko is the probability that a random customer will visit retailer 1 firs 
Jtsz
In the dynamic pricing game, because all customers search in ca a retailer's expected profit is increasing in its high pnce q .In equ pice P?D that a retailer charges when they both have products in stoc of its fill rates.
Compared with the static pricing game, fewer customers choose to rate retailer first in the dynamic pricing game than in the static pricin when they both have products in stock, the price difference between in the dynamic pricing game. Also, p-DD is lower than p,ls whereas 4, r,ss. That is, customers pay a lower price when both firms have the pro a higher price when only one firm has the product in stock. For ret ail is even lower than its marginal cost, but because it has a lower cha 
srsi
Because the retailer who invests in the Web scraping technology ha out information, it will exploit this information transparency and e monopolistic power when its rival is out of stock. In response, the re Web scraping technology has to reduce its price in order to effectiv its rival when they both have products in stock. Figure 6a depicts t priceg in different scenarios at given parameter values. We see that th following relationships: plo < pfo < pls and plo . plt ( prss. Whe lower than pfs, nls is very close to prss. This is because retailer 2 k better chance of having the product in stock. In this (dynamic, static) retailer 2 does not know when its rival is out of stock, by charging static price, it can ensure better profits when its rival runs out. On the other hand, the retailer who chooses the dynamic pricing strategy can also charge a higher price when they both have products in stock-thatis, plD > plD and p3t, plo. Figure 6b illustrates the relationship of the indifferent customer type in the four scenarios with I > koot t &ott , kfo , ko" t 0. Note that the expected demands of retailers are given by P, = ko + (l -kox I -sr) and D z = | -ko + fto( I -s,), which are increasing and decreasing in ft" respectively. Thus a retailer has the highest expected demand when it chooses the dynamic pricing strategy and its rival chooses the static pricing strategy, and it has the lowest expected demand when it chooses the static pricing strategy and its rival chooses the dynamic pricing strategy. Lemma 3: When the customer reservation value satisfies 2/s, + wr), it is optimal for both retailers to choose a pricing all customers choose contingent search strategies in each sc
It is possible that firms may choose to only serve customers with Lemma 3 shows that when customers have a high reservation va holiday shopping season, it is optimal for firms to serve all cus customers prefer to search in case of a stockout. Under the parameter condition s, > ll2,we can show that CDS > C satisfy Cot , ,r-wr) CP, then the parameter conditions in Pr 4 are all satisfied, so that a unique pricing equilibrium exists in under this parameter condition, we can show that 2/s, + w, > 2 ers'profit functions in each scenario are summarized in Table 2 payoffs in each scenario, we can derive the unique pricing equilib competition game.
Proposition 5: Whenthe parameters satisfu r > 2/s, + w,and the unique pricing equilibriumof this duopoly price competit retailer chooses the dynamic pricing strategy-that is, its pr its rival's inventory status.
Because retailing on the Internet offers an unprecedented amo especially to rival firms, retailers will act strategically and explo mation transparency with the help of Web scraping technology. P that in our simple duopoly setting, there exists a unique pricing e retailers dynamically adjust their prices based on their rival's inv this dynamic pricing strategy, price competition is intensified whe the product in stock. However, when one retailer is out of stock, th product in stock will promptly increase its price and exert a tempora Unlike the case in the static price game, where the high fill rate re a lower profit than the low fill rate retailer, in the dynamic price e fill rate retailer always enjoys a higher profit than the low fill rat Proposition 6: Comparedwith the static price game, in the u librium as stated in Proposition 5: (a) the social welfare customer types have a higher expected payment and lower ex highfiIl rate retailer enjoys a higher profit; (d) when R2 > r fill rate retailer has a lower profit; only when r > max{R2, 2/ fill rate retailer be better off than in the static pricing schem Prgposition 6 compares the welfare effects of the equilibrium with the benchmark case, which is the traditional static price game sition 5 that when the customer reservation value is high, the equ that both retailers adopt the Web scraping technology and engag game. Because customers incur lower search costs in the dynam 
sl Hl Sl sr A further analysis on retailers'profit shows that the high fill prefers to develop a Web agent to monitor its rival's stock status contingent on its rival's availability so as to extract more profits from of shortages. But for the low fill rate retailer, transparent informat stock status does not always generate more profits because, after retailer has a better chance of having the product in stock. Only reservation value is high will the low fill rate retailer also have a the dynamic pricing strategy. Thus, we find similar results as in C [6, 7] that increased information transparency offered by the Intern may lead to a profit-reducing phenomenon in electronic retailing
Concluding Remarks
THr osrecnvE oF rHrs pApER rs ro sruDy strategic information use We incorporate new features of online retailing in our model an retailers' contingent pricing strategy in response to stockouts w count customer search behavior. We show that in a market with s customer reservation value is relatively high and retailers are differ the Nash equilibrium outcome of this duopoly price competitio retailers choose to adopt the Web scraping technology, automat other's stock availability, and apply the dynamic pricing strategy. W retailer makes its pricing decision contingent on its rival's invento both have inventories, retailers charge lower prices, compared w the static pricing scheme. But when one retailer is out of stock, th promptly adjust its price and behave as a monopolist extracting its customers. Because more customers choose to visit the highfirst under the dynamic pricing scheme than under the static pricin search cost is reduced. However, all customer types are worse off pricing scheme than under the static pricing scheme because the is higher. We show that the high-availability retailer is always b dynamic pricing scheme, for its rival has a higher probability of and it can extract more surplus from its customers when its rival
In our model, customers incur different search costs while sho though online search costs are lower than those in the traditional expect that they are trivially small. A customer still has to spend time through and interact with a retailer's Web site in order to locate and find out its price and availability information. Also, customer in search costs because they are different in terms of familiarity sites, online experience, speed of Internet access, and opportun studies ll3, 14, 181 of customer online behavior indicate that differ and support our assumption on customer search cost.
Because customers incur search costs, with imperfect product availability, reta ers charge different prices and target different customer segments. Brynjolfsson a Smith [3] and Clay et al. [5] show that there is a high degree of price dispersion the online market, and retailers with the lowest prices do not receive the most sal Our model shows that being a high fill rate retailer does pay off under the dynam pricing scheme because it can charge higher prices and enjoy a higher profit level equilibrium. One implication for click-and-mortar retailers is that simply duplicatin their physical channel pricing schemes in the online world may not work well. A retailers dynamically adjust their prices contingent on their rivals' stock status, o model also provides one possible explanation for price dispersion within a firm a among retailers.
Our model naturally applies to holiday season sales and sales of seasonal or fa items. In such cases, retailers usually face long production lead time, expensive ove stock costs, and highly stochastic demands. Therefore a demand-unsatisfied market quite common. As for customers, because the product is needed in a timely mann either because it is a limited offering or a promised gift, they are willing to contin searching in case of a stockout. Another conceptual application of our model is f the hotel and airline industries, as both have limited capacity and are very active the online market. In fact, we often observe that firms in these industries adjust the prices almost simultaneously. This is an indication that they closely monitor rival price information. Because the travel industry deals with perishable products and firm often apply complicated revenue management techniques, our model may not direct apply to this industry. In this paper, we emphasize that the information about a riv being sold out does affect a firm's pricing decision for its current stock. such proa tive use of information is not limited to perishable goods. It can be also applied to a markets with shortages. Our model illustrates \ow firms can act strategically whe information about rivals becomes transparent because of the new Web technology There are some limitations to our model. First, we focus our study on a duopo case. Just as in the traditional market, the number of main players in the online reta market is also limited. Survey results and empirical studies show that most custome only purchase from a small number of favorite sites [12, l5] . Although our duopo model is a simplified case, it still sheds light on oligopoly competition.
Second, retailers are differentiated by product availability level only. While oth service factors such as return policies or online support may also affect custome choices, we omit the effects of these factors to simplify our model analysis. Smi and Brynjolfsson [25] find that while shopbot users in general are very price sensitiv frequent shopbot users are also sensitive to the average delivery time. This findin indirectly supports our assumption that customers choose retailers based on both pric and product aiailability information.
While shopbots make it easy for a customer to acquire price information across reta ers, not all products can easily work with shopbots. As we stated early, customers a often constrained by update frequency schedule and product coverage chosen by th [8] . The study in Montgomery et al. customers incur costs from using a shopbot, and directly visiting site may yield higher utility than using a shopbot that searches a all offers. But for competing firms, one-time investment in web enables them to cost-effectively collect relevant information abou retailers possess more information about the market than do con we assume that fill rates satisfy the condition rz ) r, ) 1/2. assumption because retailers with poor order fulfillment will be Trade Commission. The requirement on customers'reservation strong. Our proposed pricing equilibrium will exist when retailer ated in fill rate at given marginal cost parameters (w. wr).when r to each other in terms of fill rate, they engage in a Bertrand-ty the equilibrium nonexistence problem may surface (see Lemma In such cases, an undercut-proof equilibrium may exist, as was equal order fill rate.
NorBs
L The cost ofadopting the technology is treated as a fixed cost, whic model. Furthermore, we assume that customers will not make the same because they are just making a one-time purchase.
2. For simplicity, we assume that a customer incurs the same searc site.
3. A customer who chooses to purchase the product at one of the (1) he or she prefers this product over other products; (2) he or she p retailer over shopping in the physical channel; or (3) he or she prefers p now over placing a backorder, which often involves long waiting time especially when we consider holiday season shopping or sales of seaso a cost involved in choosing any of the possible third options.
4. We do not differentiate among the third options. It is possible tha time., customers prefer purchasing in the physical channel or ordering a placing a backorder. Also, we allow customers to have different third o is to compare the continuing-to-search strategy with a third option whe 5. The nonexistence of a pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium gence of price cycle was first identified by Edgeworth for the case whe constraints.
6. For products that are in short supply, it is not uncommon for a manuf between retailers and assign stock based on past relationships and adver Thus, we focus on studying the case where one retailer has a higher fill not oq investigating why this is the case.
7.'Similar parameter conditions are considered in Propositions 3 0 < & o < 1 .
8. Let Dl and D2 be the expected demand of retailer I and 2, resp responding expected profits for retailers are given by nr= s rD r(p r-w,) a So z, < n, when (p, -w")llp, -w r) < s rD rl(srDr). ,j + s,sr2 (3 -+s, ) + 5sf st (l -s, ) -4si (l -,, )t . 2sr(w, -u,, ) + s, (t -s, ) (5w ^t = -* , 1 t -r , 10 . We assume that if the customer chooses to continue searching at retailer 1, he again incur a search cost ft. But, if the customer finds the product is out of stock a he or she can return to retailer 2's site and purchase the product without incurring cost ft again. I 1. It is easy to show that when customers pool on retailer 1, at the given r con optimal for retailers to serve all customer types, so that all customers will search in stockout.
12.Here, z(sf (r -s, )(s, -s,s, -2sl ) -'i (r -', )) . s, (-r + zs, )( 2w, + wr) -sr(w + ^'= -,1^tr -r, -rr; sr)(sw, + 
